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IN THE SUPRExME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLEON D. TUCKER and BETTY J. TUCKER,
his wife; WILLARD M. TUCKER and
PHYLLIS 0. TUCKER, his wife;
EUGENE S. SIMPSON and JANE DOE SIMPSON,
his wife; CONTINENTAL ACCOUNT SERVICING
HOUSE, INC., A Utah Corporation; and
KEY ACCOUNT COLLECTION HOUSE, INC., a
Utah Corporation.

Case No.
14237

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Cleon D. Tucker, Betty J. Tucker,
Willard M. Tucker and Phyllis 0. Tucker.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit upon a promissory note secured
by a pledge of certain stock,seeking judgment and judicial
foreclosure of the stock, to which the Defendants raised several
defenses.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted Plaintiff partial summary
judgment against the individual Defendants only,in the sum of
$151,878.75, interest, and costs, leaving the amount of attorneys
fees to be determined later and authorized the Plaintiffs to
proceed to sell the stock securing the note.
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The lower court denied the motions of the Defendants
Cleon D. Tucker, Betty J. Tucker, Willard M. Tucker and
Phyllis 0. Tucker (hereinafter called "Defendants Tucker")
for an order that the order granting summary judgment in part
would not constitute a final judgment for lien purposes until
it should be determined whether a deficiency would exist and
the amount thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Tucker seek reversal of the Amended Order
Granting Summary Judgment in part and a trial of the outstanding issues of law and fact.
Defendants Tucker further seek a reversal of the
lower court's determination that Plaintiff could proceed to
obtain a general judgment lien on property of the Defendants
Tucker for the full amount of the partial summary judgment
without first exhausting the stock securing the note and
arriving at a deficiency judgment,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 26, 1974, the Defendants Tucker executed a
Contract of sale, under which they were to acquire frcm
Defendant Eugene S. Simpson:

a) 8,550 shares of stock in

Defendant Continental Account Servicing House, Inc. (hereinafter called "Continental") and b) 693,500 shares of stock in
Defendant Key Account Collection House, Inc. (hereinafter
called "Key") (R. 45, 62)
•-*

]
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Under the terms of the Contract of Salef Defendants
Tucker were to pay Defendant Simpson $902,000.00 for Simpsonfs
stock, (R. 46), which represented nearly all of the issued and
outstanding stock of Continental and over 50% of the issued and
outstanding stock of Key.

(R. 45).

As part of the overall transaction, Defendants Tucker
transferred certain interests in land and land contracts to
Continental and Continental issued 6,000 additional shares of
stock to the Defendants Tucker. (R. 45, 46)
5,700 of such additional shares together with the
8,550 shares in Continental and 69 3,500 shares in Key the Tuckers
were to purchase from Simpson were placed in escrow to secure a
loan made by Plaintiff Property Improvement Corporation. (R. 41,
43, 48)
On June 19, 1974, Defendants Tucker filed an action
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah
against Simpson, Continental and Key alleging that Tuckers were
induced by Simpson, Continental and Key to enter into the stock
acquisition contract by means of fraud and misrepresentations
violating federal and state securities laws.
Such federal court suit remains pending -awaiting
trial as of the time of the writing of this brief.
Defendants Tucker on the one hand and Defendants
Simpson, Continental and Key on the other, are separately
represented in this proceeding and have filed separate appeals.

3.
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Case No. 142 31 is the number assigned to the appeal
filed by Defendants Simpson, Continental and Key.

Case No.

14237 is the number assigned to the appeal filed by Defendants
Tucker.
The Promissory Note upon which Plaintiff Property
Improvement Corporation filed suit in the instant suit provides in
material part:
In the event that the undersigned shall
fail to make the aforesaid payment upon the
due date or within a grace period of 45 days
thereafter, the entire amount thereof shall
be due and payable and said Property Improvement Corporation shall proceed to receive that
stock held as security as hereinafter set forth,
sell the same at a private sale with five days
notice to the undersigned, and proceed to look
to any or all of the undersigned for any deficiency remaining thereon. (R. 41)
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint asserted a security
interest in the stock of Continental and Key in escrow to
secure the note.

It also asserted an interest in the real

property transferred to Continental by Tuckers. It demanded:
a) judgment on the note; b) a judgment that the stock securing
the note be sold at public auction by the Sheriff, c) that the
proceeds be applied toward the sums found owing the Plaintiff;
d) that if a deficiency remained, that the Tuckers1 property
which had been transferred to Continental be foreclosed and
sufficient be sold to satisfy the obligation, and e) that if
any deficiency remained thereafter, that the "Plaintiff have
judgment and execution against the Defendants, and each of them,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency."
(R. 37-40)
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Among the matters raised in defense to the Promissory
Note by answer and affidavit, was an issue of whether the
portion of the loan proceeds retained or paid to Plaintiff's
agent or agents should be deducted from the note or offset
against any amount found owing to Plaintiff. (R. 27, 77, 86,
90, 120)
In response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
the lower court left the following matters for later determination upon presentation of evidence:

a) The amount of any

attorneys' fees to be awarded Plaintiff; b) the issue of whether
Defendants Continental and Key were liable upon the note;
c) the issue of whether Defendants Simpson, Continental and
Key were entitled to a deduction or offset in the amount of
the loan proceeds received by agents of Plaintiff; d) the
issue of whether Plaintiff was entitled to foreclose upon the
Tuckers' property interests that had been transferred to
Continental. (R 92, 101)
The remaining issues raised by Defendants' Answers
and Affidavits were apparently resolved against the Defendants.
The lower court granted Plaintiff a partial summary
judgment against the Defendants Tucker and against Defendants
Eugene S. Simpson and Jane Doe Simpson for the amount of the
note, interest, and costs.

The Court also granted Plaintiff

a judgment of foreclosure on the stock securing the promissory
note. (R. 92, 101)
•" 5 .

•
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Defendants Tuckers entitlement to an offset or
deduction in the amount of the loan proceeds received by agents
of Plaintiff was raised by an Affidavit in opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment prior to the Court's
ruling on Plaintiff's Motion,

(R. 86)

Such issue was again

raised by an amended asnwer filed by the Defendants Tucker after
the court ruled.

(R. 115, 120)

Immediately after the lower court entered an Amended
Order Granting Summary Judgment in part, Plaintiff recorded
such amended order or an abstract or transcript thereof in
Utah County, Carbon County, Duchesne County, Sanpete County,
Salt Lake County (and Davis County) and perhaps in other
counties for the apparent purpose of immediately encumbering
the interests in land owned by Defendants Tucker with a judgment
lien.

(R. 105, 111)
Defendants Tucker filed motions requesting the lower

court to vacate, alter, or amend its Partial Summary Judgment
to provide it did not constitute a general judgment lien and that
no general judgment lien would arise unless and until the stock
securing Plaintiff's Promissory Note had been properly exhausted.
(R. 105-107, 111-113)
The lower court denied the motions. (R. 130-131)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GENUINE ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WERE PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS AND BY AFFIDAVIT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN PROCEEDS
RETAINED OR RECEIVED BY AN AGENT OF THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE
DEDUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OWED TO PLAINTIFF, THE ISSUE OF THE
DOLLAR AMOUNT SO RETAINED, AND THE ISSUE OF THE AMOUNT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(c) ... The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue or to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here the lower court itself recognized that there were
issues going to the anount of the judgment that should be awarded
which could not be resolved without a trial.
The first issue the lower court recognized right in its
Minute Entry (R. 92) was whether an offset or deduction should
be allowed in the amount of thu loai proceeds that never reached
any of the Defendants.
By Affidavit the Defendants Tucker averred that the entire
amount of the loan proceeds had gone either to agents of the
Plaintiff or to the other Defendants. (R. 36)
It is manifest that if an offset is proper in the amount
of the loan proceeds retained by a lenderfs agent, then that
reduces the obligation itself and thus automatically inures
equally to the benefit of all borrowers.

It was manifest error

for the lower court to in effect hold that the Defendants, all
7. .....
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of whom signed the note in the same capacity, i.e.,

as makers,

could be liable for different amounts when they all undertook
exactly the same obligation to the lender.
The second issue the lower court recognized was the
amount of attorneyfs fees to be awarded.

With these issues

unresolved it was manifest error for the lower court to direct
foreclosure of the stock securing the note.

Since the amount

* of any offset and the amount of attorney's fees on the note
remained to be determined, there was no fixed dollar liability
of the Defendants to the Plaintiff against which the proceeds
of the immediate stock foreclosure sale permitted could be
measured. There was no predicate for a proper sheriff's return
showing the amount of a deficit or surplus because there was
no settled dollar starting point.

If the retained loan proceeds

amount to $50,000.00, Defendants could well argue the Sheriff
would have to stop selling shares of stock after getting $100,000.00
since that was the amount of liability to plaintiff that existed.
If the Sheriff sold stock up to $150,000.00 plus and
$100,000.00 was the total liability, would the Sheriff be liable
for wrongful execution or conversion of $50,000.00 plus worth
of stock?

How could the Sheriff know how much to add for attorney's

fees in arriving at the point at which he should cease selling
stock?
The Court obviously erred in granting the partial
summary judgment granted when it recognized right in its own
partial summary judgment decision, outstanding issues of fact
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a

and law that prevented it from arriving at the actual dollar
liability of the Defendants.

This manifest error alone requires

reversal and remand without a recitation of the further legal
issues raised by the defenses to the note set forth in Defendants'
respective anwers and affidavits.

'

POINT II
THE AMENDED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART
SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED, ALTERED OR AMENDED TO SHOW THE SAME
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL JUDGMENT THAT COULD BE DOCKETED IN
SEVERAL COUNTIES TO IMMEDIATELY CREATE A JUDGMENT LIEN ON REAL
PROPERTY PRIOR TO FORECLOSURE OF THE STOCK PLEDGED TO SECURE THE
OBLIGATION AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF ANY DEFICIENCY.
No provision in the promissory note made Exhibit "A"
to Plaintiff1s Complaint, (R. 41) no provision in the escrow
instructions made Exhibit "B" to Plaintiff's Complaint, (R. 43)
and no provision in the contract of sale made Exhibit "C" to
Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 45) permits Plaintiff to ignore the
stock securing the note in favor of a general lien statewide on
the property of the Defendants Tucker right in the middle of a
lawsuit brought by Plaintiff specifically demanding that the stock
be first sold and then that specific land interests be sold, and
then that a personal judgment be rendered for any remaining
deficiency.
The court grossly erred in allowing Plaintiff to thus
proceed

clear

outside and beyond not only the terms of the
9.
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instruments themselves but even beyond the demands for relief
contained in Plaintiff's Complaint and Affidavit in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The note plainly provides in material part that upon
non payment Plaintiff:
"Shall proceed to receive that stock held as
security..., sell the same at a private sale with
five day's notice... and proceed to look to any or all
of the undersigned for any deficiency remaining
thereon." (R. 41)
The escrow instructions plainly state that the stock:
"Will be held as security for the performance of
the undersigned in the payment of the promissory note
owing to Property Improvement Corporation by the undersigned. If on or before May 13, 1975, your office has
not received written notification from Property Improvement Corporation that the note has been paid in full
together with interest due thereon, then you are to
immediately deliver to Property Improvement Corporation
all of the said shares together with stock powers
relative thereto. This you will do without further
notice or demand from any party hereto." (R. 43)
The contract of sale plainly provides that if Plaintiff's
note is not paid by Defendant Simpson should Defendants Tucker
not pay it:
"... said escrow agent shall forthwith transfer
said stock certificates to the individual making said
loan who may proceed to exercise the same with full
rights of ownership."
The above quoted provisions of the agreements relied
upon by Plaintiff are all of the provisions dealing with and setting
forth the parties agreements as to what Plaintiff's rights would be
upon non payment of the note.

No provision in the agreements

gives Plaintiff the right to skip ahead to a general judgment
10.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lien on all Defendants1 property for the full amount of the
note even before finding out whether and to what extent there
might actually be a deficiency after sale of the stock.
As mentioned above, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
demands: a) a judgment that the stock be sold; b) if a deficiency
should remain after sale of the stock, a foreclosure sale as to
the interests in real property Defendants Tucker transferred to
Defendant Continental; c) if a deficiency should remain after
such foreclosure sale "that Plaintiff have judgment and execution
against the Defendant, and each of them, jointly and severally,
for the full amount of such deficiency."

(R. 39-40)

Plaintiff's Affidavit in support of Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment demands the same thing as Plaintiff's
Complaint - judgment and execution against the Defendants for
any deficiency only after first a sale of the stock and secondf
a sale of specific real property. (R. 78-79)
The lower court properly decided a summary judgment
would not be proper as to Plaintiff's demand for foreclosure of
certain real property belonging to Defendants Tucker without a
trial to determine the legal issues involved, but then permitted
Plaintiff an end run procedure exactly like full exhaustion of
all security had already occurred.
The lower court's Partial Summary Judgment and refusal
to prevent the use thereof as a final personal judgment, gave
Plaintiff lien rights and imposed upon Defendants Tucker burdens
•

•

1

1

.

'••"'
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way beyond that provided by agreement and way beyond that asked
by the Plaintiff's own pleadings as well.
In doing so the lower court compounded the manifest
legal error that occurred when it granted judgment for a sum,
reserving for future resolution issues that would push the judgment amount up or down, yet permitting immediate foreclosure of
the stock securing whatever sum was actually owing.

Its action

placed Defendants Tucker in a totally untenable position.

Tuckers

were thus faced with being compelled to pay whatever Plaintiff
should demand as the cost of obtaining the release of Plaintiff's
apparent $151,000.00 judgment lien on Tuckers' property and closing
down Tuckers1 land development and sales program while trying
to clear Tucker's titles to land of the unwarranted cloud of the
order granting summary judgment through this appeal proceeding.
This the lower court permitted notwithstanding the fact that stock
securing Plaintiff's note could be expected to totally satisfy
the same if it brought only a very small fraction of what Defendant
Simpson insisted

it was worth when selling the same stock to

Defendants Tucker for $902,000.00.
The result reached by the lower court flies squarely
in the fact of the ordinary principle of contract law that a
contract is to be enforced according to its terms.
Such result is unsupported by and beyond Plaintiff's
own pleadings.
Further, such result contravenes the policy and purpose
of Utah's "one action",

"primary fund" rule respecting the
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foreclosure of mortgages upon real estate and

personal property.

Sections 78-37-1, and 78-37-2, Utah Code Annotated, (1953);
Boucofski v, Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pac. 117(1909); cf
Walker v. Community Bank, 111 Cal Rptr. 897, 518 P.2d 729
(1974).
Finally, Defendants Tucker submit that the lower courts
"Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part" was not the
kind of "judgment" intended by the judgment lien statute, Section
78-22-1, Utah Code Annotated, (1953).
The latter statute provides:
From the time the judgment is docketed it becomes
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment
debtor, not exempt from execution, in the county in
which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence
of such lien •..
The statute refers to a "judgment debtor".
for a lien continuing for eight (8) years.

It provides

It obviously contem-

plates a final personal money judgment upon which a general
execution might be levied.
It does not contemplate an interim order authorizing
foreclosure of property securing an obligation where the question
of whether and the extent to which there will be a deficiency has
not yet been determined.

See Boyle v. Baggs, 10 Utah 2d 203,

350 P.2d 622 (1960); Roach v. Roach, 132 N.E.2d 742 (Ohio 1956);
and McClanahan v. Hawkins, 367 P.2d 196 (Ariz. 1961).
In Boyle v. Baggs, this Court reaffirmed the construction
of Utahfs judgment creditor lien statute set forth in Beesley
v. Badger,

66 Utah 194, 240 Pac. 458(1925).
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In the Beesley v. Badger case, this Court held:
"that a money judgment may be a lien, it is
essential, not only that there be a valid and
subsisting judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and subject to collection by
execution, but the judgment must also be for the
payment of a definite and certain sum of money,"
(emphasis added)
The general considerations requiring such a construction were discussed in Boyle v. Baggs;
(a)

An indefinite judgment depending on circum-

stances outside the judgment would put a would be
purchaser of real property at a disadvantage involving
possible or probable litigation to definitely determine
the facts upon which the existence of the judgment
lien depended.
(b)

It is the policy of the law to keep land

titles clear and to encourage alienability of property
rather than the contrary.
(c)

The construction placed on the statute should

make the statute practical and workable in operation.
The same policy considerations have resulted in other
states interpreting and applying their respective judgment credit
or lien statues the same way.

See Roach v. Roach and McClanahan

v. Hawkins, supra and cases cited therein.
Non final, inconclusive judgments, if liens or if
they even appear on the records as possible liens, obviously
serve only to cloud titles, create confusion, impel title companies
14.
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to make exceptions unacceptable to purchasers and hence to
breed quiet title suits and slander of title actions.
The lower court1s allowance of Plaintiff's effort
to cloud all of the Tuckers1 land titles with the order granting
summary judgment was and is particularly abusive and inappropriate here for the reason that the Tuckers1 business and livelihood was and is land development and sales, hence the cloud
created by Plaintiff's recording of the order in county after
county was and is particularly harmful to the Tuckers because
of its effect to obstruct sales and prevent the making of contracts
of sale even though Plaintiffs was not in a position to seek
a writ of execution.

(R. Ill,112) Prospective purchasers obviously

would hardly agree to buy with the $150,000*00 summary judgment
appearing on the title report*
No legitimate purpose was served by the lower court's
refusal to make it clear that its

allowance of a partial summary

judgment and foreclosure of stock was not a final fixed dollar
judgment for purposes of the creditor lien statute.
This court, in Bell v. Jones, 110 P.2d 327 (Utah 1941)
struck a portion of a judgment that could have been construed
to cloud title by giving a vendors lien even though this court
decided the such would not actually be the effect of the language
stricken.

Similar action,sought here by Tuckers^ was the lower

Court's clear duty.
15.
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Clearly no purpose was or is to be served by ignoring
Tuckers plea thus unnecessarily forcing them either into a
thicket of further suits concerning their land titles, shutting
down their business or both when sale of the specific security
for Plaintiff's note may well satisfy the entire obligation.
CONCLUSION
The partial summary judgment should be reversed or
vacated.
The lower court should be directed to resolve the
issue of offset or deduction and the amount of any attorney's
fees so as to fix the actual amount of Defendants1 liability
to Plaintiff before directing foreclosure of the security.
The lower court should be further directed to insert
provisions in any proper judgment of foreclosure of the security
hereafter entered/making it clear that such a judgment does not
give general creditor judgment lien rights under the statute
and that such lien rights will come into existence only upon
the docketing of any actual final personal deficiency judgment
after proper exhaustion of all property securing the obligation
to Plaintiff.
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Arthur H. Nielsen
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